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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
~IAX

FAUSETT,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

GENERAL ELECTRIC CONTRACTS
CORPORATION, a foreign corporation, and WILLIA:Jf HOLDAWAY,
Defendants and Appellants.

No. 6251

BRIEF OF APPELLANT GENERAL ELECTRIC
CONTRACTS CORPORATION

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In July, 1938, Defendant William Holdaway and one
Earl Fausett were doing business in Price, Utah, as the
Carbon Furniture & Appliance Company; selling, among
other things, Hot Point refrigerators. On July 7, 1938
these partners sold Plaintiff Max Fausett a Hot Point
refrigerator for a total purchase price, including sales
tax, of $216.64. The contract attached to Plaintiff's
Amended Complaint as Exhibit "A" (Tr. 19a, Ab. 12)
recited a cash payment of $75.00, the balance due in
fourteen consecutive monthly installments of $10.00 each,
eommencing July 25, 1938, and the final payment being
in the sum of $11.64.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Plaintiff was given possession of the refrigerator
and placed it in his home in Price, Utah. On May 29,
1939 Defendant William Holdaway went to the home of
Max Fausett in Price, Utah for the purpose of repossessing the refrigerator. No one was at home, the door was
open and Defendant Holdaway took the refrigerator out
of the house. (Tr. 254-255, Ab. 134).
On July 13, 1939 Plaintiff commenced this action
against the Defendants General Electric Contracts Cor~
poration and William Holdaway for the unlawful repossession of the refrigerator.
After July 7, 1938, when the refrigerator in question
was sold to Plaintiff, the partnership between William
Holdaway and Earl Fausett was dissolved. (Tr. 30, Ab.
89).
The contract which was taken by the Carbon Furniture & Appliance Company from the Plaintiff Holdawayt
which is Plaintiff's Exhibit "A", and a copy of which
is attached to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Ab. 13)
among other things provided that
''Title to said property shall not pass to the
· Buyer until said Total Time Price is fully paid
in cash. * * * Should the Buyer fail to pay said
Time Price or any part thereof when due, *' • • the
entire unpaid balance shall at once become rlue
and payable at the Seller's election, and the Seller
may, without notice or demand, by process of la\v
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or otherwise, take possession of said property
wherever located, and retain all moneys paid
thereon for the reasonable use of said property,
* * *. The Buyer waives all claims, damages and
de1nands against the Seller arising out of the
repossession, retention and sale as aforesaid.''
''Time is of the essence of this contract. All
rights and remedies hereunder are cumulative and
not alternative.''
This contract was sold to General Electric Contracts
Corporation shortly after its execution. (Tr. 14, Ab. 87).
Pursuant to a dealer's agreement between General Electric Contracts Corporation and Carbon Second Hand
Store, which is Defendants' Exhibit 1, (Tr. 31, Ab. 89)
(also Tr. 405 to 413) whereby the Carbon Second Hand
Store, sometimes referred to as Carbon Furniture &
Appliance Company, guaranteed ''the payment of all
deferred payments on accounts sold to you (General
Electric Contracts Corporation) hereunder at the time
and in the manner specified in the accounts, and we
(Carbon Furniture & Appliance Company) further covenant that if there shall be default in the payment of any
two installments of an account or in the performance of
any requirement imposed on the Buyer therein, we shall
pay you in cash, on demand, an amount equal to the
unpaid balance on said account less such proper portion
of your purchase charge as you may determine.''
After the contract had been purchased by General
Electric Contracts Corporation the following payments
were received :
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Payment due July 29, 1938, received August 15,
1938;
Payment due August 29, 1938, received September
19,1938;
Payment due on September 29, 1938, received December 1, 1938;
Payment due October 29, 1938, received one-half
December 1, 1938 and one-half February 21,
1939;
Payment due November 29, 1938, received February 21, 1939 ;
·
Payment due December 29, 1938, received February 21, 1939 ;
Payment due January 29, 1939, received April
7, 1939;
Payment due February 29, 1939, received one-half
April 7, 1939.
There were no further payments made and the refrigerator was repossessed on May 29, 1939.
During the time that Plaintiff was in possession of
the refrigerator in question Defendant General Electric
Contracts Corporation wrote collection letters to the
Plaintiff or his wife under the following dates:
November 3, 1938
November 9, 1938
November 16, 1938
N ov~mber 22, 1938
December 1, 1938
December 16, 1938
December 22, 1938
December 28, 1938

February 27, 1939
March 27, 1939
March 13, 1939
March 23, 1939
April 7, 1939
April 27, 1939
~lay 4, 1939
~fay 11, 1939
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The letter of ~fay 11, 1939, reads as foll-ows : ( Tr.
<:1:3-1, Defendants' Ex. 8).
''Dear nfr. Fausett :
''Your lack of response to my letter of May
4 is disappointing.

''I cannot believe you would willingly lose
the large equity which you have without making
some effort to protect it.
"However, since you have not replied to my
previous letters and have not made payment on
your account, we are instructing your dealer to
take immediate action to enforce the penalties
outlined in your contract.
''You may still keep the merchandise if you
wish, upon payment of $66.64, which represents
the balance due on the account.
''Very truly yours,

H. P. GouGH, Manager."
"hpgjlb
On May 12, 1939, General Electric Contracts Corporation wrote to Defendant Holdaway, who was then running the Carbon Furniture & Appliance Company, as
follows: (Tr. 436, Defendants' Ex. 10).
'' Dear Bill :
"In accordance with our conversation, we are
attaching our formal repurchase request on the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Max Fausett account. I wish you would advise
me as soon as you are successful in obtaining this
merchandise.
''Very truly yours,

H. P. GouGH.''
On May 29, 1939 Defendant Holdaway repossessed
the refrigerator (Tr. 254, Ab. 134) and stored it in the
William Campbell warehouse in Price. (Tr. 255, Ab. 135)
and eventually resold it in the latter part of June to
J. R. Moyle, for $100.00.
About July 13, 1939 Pete Woolsey, brother-in-law of
Plaintiff, offered Defendant Holdaway a check for $66.64
as the balance due on the refrigerator. (Tr. 286, Ab. 137).
Defendant Holdaway refused to accept it and claimed
there was a balance due of $96.64, that there was still
$30.00 due him as the down payment on the refrigerator.
(Tr. 287, Ab. 138). Defendant Holdaway figured that
he was entitled to the $4.00 difference between the amount
due him and the amount received from the resale of the
refrigerator as part of his expenses and costs. ( Tr. 294,
Ab. 139).
At the trial of the case the Defendant General Electric Contracts Corporation moved for a non-suit on the
following grounds: (Tr. 173, Ab. 116).
First: That there is no evidence of a conversion of the personal property described in the
plaintiff's complaint.
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Second: That there is no evidence to go to the
JUry as to any damages suffered by the defendants.
Third: That there is no evidence that the defendant. ''"rillian1 Holda\vay, was, at the time that
he repossessed the refrigerator, acting as the
agent of this defendant.
And at the conclusion of the Defendants' case the
Defendant General Electric Contracts Corporation moved for directed verdict upon the following grounds: (Tr.
306, Ab. 142).
First: That there is no evidence to go to the
jury of any conversion of the refrigerator in question by the Defendant, General Electric Contracts
Corporation.
Second: That there is no evidence of damage,
if any, suffered by plaintiff, to be passed upon
by the jury.
·
Third: That there is no evidence to be considered by the jury relative to the question
whether the defendant Holdaway, at any time,
acted as agent for the General Electric Contracts
Corporation.
Fourth: That counsel for plaintiff has stated
that his action is an action in claim and delivery,
. and the evidence affirmatively and without dispute shows that at the time of the commencement
of the action that this defendant was not in pt>s . .
session of the refrigerator in question.
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This motion was joined in by Defendant William
Holdaway. Both of these motions were overruled and
the case submitted to the jury. (Tr. 386, Ab. 57). The
jury returned a verdict for $75.00 for wrongful possession and retention of the refrigerator and $184.14 the
value of the refrigerator. It being apparent that the
amount fixed by the jury as the value of the refrigerator
was greater than its cost less the amount still due upon
the same, Plaintiff filed a document captioned "Remittitur'' whereby Plaintiff attempted to remit from the
verdict of the jury the sum of $66.64. (Tr. 141, Ab. 60).
This was accompanied by Plaintiff's motion to reduce
judgment, (Tr. 142, Ab. 60) which motion was granted
and the judgment reduced on February 19, 1940. (Tr.
145, Ab. 61).
Defendant General Electric Contracts Corporation,
filed a motion for new trial ( Tr. 136, A b. 59) which was,
on the 19th of February, 1940, duly denied. ( Tr. 146,
Ab. 62).
QUESTIONS TO BE DETERMINED
UPON THIS APPEAL
A multitude of questions could be made out of the
errors which were committed in the trial of this case and
that are raised by the Assignment of Errors. However,
they may be simply grouped and determined as follows:
1. There was no unlawful repossession of the Fausett refrigerator by William Holdaway, and the evidence
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failing to support such an unlawful repossession, the
court erred in refusing~ Defendants' motion for non-suit
and Defendants' motion for a directed verdict, and the
same question is incorporated in the exceptions taken to
the instructions of the court.
2. There is no evidence that William Holdaway, in
repossessing the refrigerator, was acting as the agent of
General Electric Contracts Corporation, and accordingly
the court erred in denying Defendants' motion for a nonsuit and Defendants' motion for directed verdict, as well
as in his instructions to the jury on this point.
3. The court erred in his instructions to the jury
on the question of damages and the jury failed to follow
the instructions of the court in returning a verdict for
more than the initial cost price of the refrigerator less
the admitted unpaid balance due thereon and the court
could not correct this error by arbitrarily deducting from
the verdict of the jury the unpaid balance due thereon.

THERE WAS NO UNLAWFUL REPOSSESSION
OF THE FAUSETT REFRIGERATOR
There seems to be no dispute about the following
facts.
The refrigerator was sold under a title retaining
contract, reciting a $75.00 down payment, calling for
fourteen monthly installments of $10.00 each, with the
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exception of the final installment which was to be $11.64.
The first installment was due July 25, 1938. This contract, which has been discussed in the statement of facts,
retained title in the seller and gave the seller the right,
without notice or demand or process of law, to retake
possession of the refrigerator wherever located upon the
buyer's failing to make any of the payments when due.
There is no question whatever but that the buyer had
been in default under said contract from the beginning,
and that at no time was the contract current. (Ab. 126,
Tr. 215). At the time the refrigerator was repossessed
only one-half of the payment due in February had been
paid and all of the installments for March, April and
May were past due. In addition thereto the Defendant
General Electric Contracts Corporation had written the
Plaintiff on May 11, to the effect that by reason of the
payments not having been made the dealer was going
to take immediate action to enforce the penalties in the
contract. The Plaintiff's attention was also called to the
fact at that time that he could redeem the merchandise
upon the payment of $66.64. (Defendants' Ex. 8, Tr.
434).
As to the manner in which the refrigerator was repossessed, there is no dispute and all witnesses are
agreed that no one was at home at the Fausett dwelling
when the refrigerator was repossessed. The wife of
Plaintiff, Sylvia Fausett, so testified. (Ab. 95, Tr. 62).
She said that she left the house unlocked and when she
returned about five days later she found the refrigerator
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,vas gone, but that the contents had been taken out and
placed upon a chair. ~Irs. Fausett's statement to Defendant Holda,vay over the telephone on her return was
as follows: ''Well, I asked hhn just what business he had
going in 1n.y ho1ne when I was not there and taking my
refrigerator.·' This would indicate that she had sort of
expected to have the refrigerator repossessed.
The only other witnesses to testify concerning the
repossession of the refrigerator are Defendant Holdaway
and the man who accompanied him, Clarence Packer. On
this subject Defendant Holdaway said (Ab. 134, Tr. 254),
''There was no one home, the door was open and I could
see the refrigerator in there.''
There is no testimony or evidence offered or introduced in this matter indicating that there was any breach
of the peace _of any sort committed by Defendant Holdaway in repossessing the refrigerator. The evidence is,
furthermore, without dispute that the Fausett contract
was sadly in default when the refrigerator was repossessed. The evidence further shows without dispute that
during the period from July to May, during which the
Fausetts had had possession of the refrigerator, the Defendant General Electric Contracts Corporation had
written the Fausetts fifteen collection letters, and that at
each time the contract was in default and in addition
thereto Defendant Holdaway had made numerous personal calls and telephone calls to the Fausetts relative to
their delinquent account.
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The general rule applicable to this situation is well
stated in
24 R. C. L. 486
as follows:
''On the default of the buyer the seller may,
ordinarily, exercise his right to retake possession
without resort to the courts. And it is said that
the seller has an implied irrevocable license to
enter the buyer's premises and remove the goods
on breach of the contract; and a fortiori, if the
right so to re-enter is expressly reserved to the
seller it cannot }?e revoked by the buyer and, after
an attempted revocation, it may be exercised without liability to the buyer for trespass.''
This rule has been sustained in a great many cases.
The Massachusetts court, in the case of

Lambert v. Robinson, 37 N. E. 753
held that where the contract so provided the seller had
a right to forcefully enter a farmer's dwelling house for
the purpose of taking property conditionally sold when
the buyer had failed to meet the payments provided thereIn.
The Maryland court, in the case of
Walsh v. Taylor, 39 Md. 592
held that under a contract similar to that now before the
Court, upon the default of the buyer, the seller had a
r~ght to enter upon the buyer's property to reclaim possession of the buyer's property sold under a conditional
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sale contract. The court said that the clause in the conditional sale contract giving the seller the right to repossess the property 'vithout legal proceedings, and also
the right to enter upon the buyer's property for that
purpose, gave the seller an irrevocable license or a license coupled 'vith an interest which the buyer could not
withdraw so as to hold the seller to be a trespasser. To
the same effect see

TValker Furniture Co. v. Dyson, 32 App. D. C.
90.
The Alabama court, in the case of

JlrfcCarty-Greene Motor Co. v. House, 216 Ala.
666, 114 s. 60
supports the same rule.
The Iowa court, in the case of

Flaherty v. Ginsberg, 135 Iowa 743, 110 N. W.
1050
sustained the right of the vendor to retake without judicial process where such a right was given in the contract~
The courts have held in a number of cases that a
peaceable retaking by the vendor upon the default of
the vendee without legal process gives the vendee no
cause of action against the vendor.

Swain v. Schild (1917), 66 Ind. App. 156, 117
N. E. 933
Van Wren v. Flynn (1882), 34 La. Ann. 1158
Heath v. Randall ( 1849), 4 Cush. (Mass.) 195
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Vorenberg v. American House Hotel Co.
(1923), 246 ~fass. 108, 140 N. E. 297
Lynch v. Sable-Oberteuffer-Peterson, 260 P.
222, 122 Ore. 597
North v. Williams (1888), 120 Pa. 109, 6 An1.
St. Rep. 695, 13 A. 723
Abel v. M. H. Pickering Co. (1914), 58 Pa. Sup.
Ct. 439
Although the Plaintiff has not specifically pleaded
a case contending that the Plaintiff had a right to redeem the refrigerator after it had once been repossessed,
nevertheless the court saw fit to allow considerable testimony to be introduced on Plaintiff's request and particularly the testimony of Sylvia Fausett (Ab. 97, Tr.
78-90) and the testimony of the brother of Plaintiff's
wife, Myron Woolsey (Ab. 107, Tr. 134-138) and the
testimony of Clara Pierce, (Ab. 108, Tr. 139-141) all to
the effect that after the refrigerator had been repossessed by Defendant Holdaway they tendered the balance due thereon, $66.64.
The authorities are quite uniform to the effect that
after property has been lawfully repossessed by the seller
tfie buyer has no right of redemption.

Penchof v. Heller, 176 Minn. 493, 223 N. W. 911
Lynch v. Sable-Oberteuffer-Peterson, supra
Silverthorne v. Simon, 59 Cal. App. 494, 211
P. 26
In view of the foregoing authorities Appellant contends that there was no evidence of any unlawful repossession of the refrigerator in question and that the court
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erred in refusing Appellants' motion for a non-suit on
that ground and further erred in refusing Appellants'
motion for a directed verdict, and in refusing and denying Appellants' requested Instructions Nos. 1 and 2, and
on this ground alone the case should be reversed.
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT WILLIAM HOLDAWAY IN THE REPOSSESSION OF THE REFRIGERATOR WAS ACTING AS AGENT OF GENERAL
ELECTRIC CONTRACTS CORPORATION.
This question was squarely presented to the Court
in this Defendant's motion for non-snit as well as its
motion for a directed verdict, both of which motions
were denied. It was also squarely presented in Defendant'B requested instructions Nos. 4 and 5 which were
refused by the court and the court in his instructions
definitely held that as a matter of law the Defendant
Holdaway in repossessing the refrigerator in question
was acting as the agent of Defendant General Electric
Contracts Corporation. In this respect Instruction No.
15 is informative where the court said,
"The court instructs the jury that it is imInaterial who was the actual owner of said refrigerator on May 30, 1939, yet, if you find that the
plaintiff was entitled to the possession of said refrigerator on that date, then your verdict must
be for the plaintiff and against the defendants for
the possession of said refrigerator * ~ * . ''
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Let us take a look at the testimony and evidence
bearing .upon this question of agency. There is no question but what the refrigerator in question was purchased
from the Carbon Furniture & Appliance Company, which
was owned by William Holdaway and Earl Fausett, and
that subsequently Earl Fausett sold all his interest in
the Company to William Holdaway. There was no question but that Defendant William Holdaway was the party
who repossessed the refrigerator on May 29. There was
also no question but what the Carbon Furniture & Appliance Company at the time of the sale of the refrigerator in question to Plaintiff, and also at the time of the
repossession of said refrigerator, was bound to Defendant
General Electric Contracts Corporation by a dealer's
contract. (Defendants' Ex. 1, Tr. 405.)
There is further no question but what Plaintiff's con.
tract with the Carbon Furniture & Appliance Company
was duly sold and assigned to the General Electric Contracts Corporation pursuant to the terms of said dealer
contract. Among other things said dealer contract contained. a promise on behalf of the Carbon Furniture &
Appliance Company (the Defendant Holdaway as of the
time of trial) in the following language:
"We hereby guarantee the payments of all
deferred payments on accounts sold to you hereunder at the time and in the manner specified in
said accounts, and we further covenant that if
there shall be default in any two installments of
an account or in the performance of any require-
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ments in1posed upon the buyer therein, we shall
pay you in cash, on de1nand, an an1ount equal to
the unpaid balance on said account, less such
proper portion of your purchase charge as you
may determine.''
This contract further provided :
''As and when you have received payment in
full from us (Carbon Furniture & Appliance Company) of any account on which the Buyer has not
made payment in full you will, on written demands
from us, reassign to us without recourse to you,
such account* * *."
It is therefore apparent that during the whole period
that the Defendant General Electric Contracts Corpora..
tion held the Plaintiff's contract the Defendant Holdaway was a surety and guarantor of the Plaintiff's obligation to Defendant General Electric Contracts Corporation and that he therefore had a direct interest on his
own account in seeing that the Plaintiff's payments to
the Defendant General Electric Contracts Corporation
were promptly made. He was also interested in the protection of the security, that is, the refrigerator, and after
notification from the General Electric Contracts Corporatoin to repurchase the Plaintiff's contract, which notice
is Defendant's Ex. 10, Tr. 436, the obligation of collecting
Plaintiff's account was solely the obligation of Defendant Holdaway and the question of repossession for nonpayment of the purchase price was solely that of Defendant Holdaway.
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Plaintiff will contend that in the face of these indisputable facts the jury should have been allowed to
speculate upon Defendant Holdaway's agency and by
reason of such testimony as that of Sylvia Fausett, where
she said that she talked with Holdaway after finding the
refrigerator was gone and he said (Ab. 95, Tr. 67) that
he was working under orders. It will be noted that even
the wife of Plaintiff did not go so far as to say under
whose orders.
Plaintiff will also probably contend that the occurrence in the office of the General Electric Contracts Corporation at Salt Lake City, after the repossession of the
refrigerator, at which time Mrs. Fausett tendered the
balance due on the refrigerator and Mr. Lyon, of General Electric Contracts Corporation said in response to
such tender that $66.64 would clear said account as far
as said Corporation was concerned, but he did not know
how they stood with Defendant Holdaway, would be some
evidence to go to the jury.
On this point Appellant will undertake to call to the
court's attention the pertinent sections of the Restatement of Agency for the purpose of illustrating the error
of the trial court in submitting the question of agency
to the. jury. For the purpose of delimiting the question
before the court let us first say that there is no question of an express agency involved in this matter. Any
agency which the court or jury might find would, of
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necessity, have to be an agency arising out of "apparent
authority.'' Furthermore, there is no question of affirmance or ratification involved in this case.
Section 220 defines a servant and sets up the factors to be considered in determining whether or not a
person at a given time and place is the servant of another.

"Section 220. Definition. (1) A servant is a
person employed to perform service for another in
his affairs and who, with respect to his physical
conduct in the performance of the service, is subject to the ·other's control or right to control.
(2) In determining whether one acting for
another is a servant or an independent contractor,
the following matters of fact, among others, are
considered :
(a) the extent of control which, by agreement,
the master may exercise over the details
of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to
whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision.
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentality, tools and the
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place of work for the person doing the
work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is
employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by time
or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the
regular business of the employer ; and
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are
creating the relationship of master and
servant.''
There is no claim on the part of anyone that Defendant Holdaway was acting as an independent contractor in repossessing the refrigerator. It is conceded
by all that he was acting for himself but Plaintiff contends that in addition thereto he was acting for and on
behalf of Defendant General Electric Contracts Corporation. If this is true, then Defendant General Electric Contracts Corporation must have been in a position of a
principal, as set forth in Section 14 of the Restatement
of Agency:

· "Section 14. A principal has the right to control the conduct of the agent with respect to matters intrusted to him.''
It would also be necessary to find some manifestation from the agreement to the agent that the agent may
act on account of the principal, as set forth in Section 15.
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'' Sect~ion 15. An agency relationship exists if
there has been a manifestation by the principal to
the agent that the agent may act on his account,
and consent by the agent so to act.''
There is not one scintilla of evidence that Defendant
General Electric Contracts Corporation had the right to
control Defendant Holdaway in the repossession of the
refrigerator, nor is there any evidence that General Electric Contracts Corporation indicated in any way that Defendant Holdaway could repossess the refrigerator on
its account.
The question of apparent authority is covered by
Section 27 in the following language:

'' SeGtion 27. Apparent Authority. Except for
the execution of instruments under seal or for the
conduct of transactions required by statute to be
authorized in a particular way, apparent authority to do an act may be created by written or
spoken words or any other conduct of the principal which, reasonably interpreted, causes a third
person to believe that the principal consents to
have the act done on his behalf by the person purporting to act for him. "
There is no question but what there is no evidence
of any conduct on behalf of Defendant General Electric
Contracts Corporation which could be construed as au·thorizing Defendant Holdaway to repossess the refrigerator on its behalf. Section 26 outlines ~n the following
language what constitutes the creation of authority:
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"Section 26. Creation of Authority. Except
for the execution of instruments under seal or for
the performance of transactions required by statute to be authorized in a particular way, authority
to do an act may be created by written or spoken
words or other conduct of the principal, which
reasonably interpreted causes the agent to believe
that the principal desires him to act on the principal's account.''
It goes without saying that there is no contention by
Plaintiff of the creation of any such authority by this
Defendant.
The restatement, In Section 33, indicates that any
authorization or claimed authorization must be interpreted as of the time it is acted upon and in the light of
the conditions under which it was made.

"Section 33. An authorization is interpreted
as of the time it is acted upon in light of the conditions under which it was made and changes in
conditions subsequent thereto.''

In this connection it is well to again recall that at
the time the refrigerator was repossessed the Defendant General Electric Contracts Corporation had called
upon Defendant Holdaway to repurchase the Fausett
contract because it was delinquent, all under the terms
and conditions of the dealer contract existing between Defendant General Electric Contracts Corporation and Defendant Holdaway. The evidence conclusively shows,
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and .without dispute, that Defendant General Electric
Contracts Corporation, at the time of repossession, was
looking to Defendant Holdaway for reimbursement
against the advances made by it and not to
Fausett or the refrigerator, and that if Defendant Holdaway were to make himself whole out of the Fausett
contract it was necessary for him to exercise the rights
given to him under that contract, and that was to realize
upon the security.

THE COURT ERRED IN HIS INSTRUCTIONS TO
THE JURY ON THE QUESTION OF DAMAGES,
AND THE JURY FAILED TO FOLLOW THE
INSTRUCTIONS OF THE COURT.
On this point let us call the court's attention first
to the law on this very important item. The rule seems
to be well established that the measure of damages for
the unlawful conversion by the seller of property sold
under a conditional sales contract after the buyer has
made payments thereon is the actual value of the property at the time of the conversion, less the unpaid purchase price.

Roper Wholesale Grocery v. Favor (1910), 8
Ga. App. 178, 68 S. E. 883
Smith v. Goff (1909), 29 R.I. 439, 72 A. 289
Goggan v. Garner (1909) (Tex.) 119 S. W. 341
Clark v. Clement (1903), 75 Vt. 417, 56 A. 94
There seems to be no dispute in the authorities concern..
ing this rule of law.
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The court in his 15th Instruction instructed the jury
as to the measure of damages, should they find for Plaintiff and find that the refrigerator could not be returned
to the Plaintiff, in the following language: (Ab. 51, Tr.
71)
''You must find and determine the value of the
refrigerator from the evidence in this case.''
The court further touched upon this matter in his 16th
Instruction (Ab. 51, Tr. 72) in the following language:
that the Defendant William Holdaway
pay to the Plaintiff the reasonable value of said
refrigerator at the time it was taken, with legal interest thereon from May 30, 1939. ''
'' * * *

It is worthy of note that the court at no place in his
instructions instructed the jury as to the true measure
of damages. Nowhere in the court's instructions did he
tell the jury that they should take into consideration the
unpaid balance still due thereon at the time of the repossession. On this point there is no dispute whatsoever that there was a balance due on the refrigerator at
the time of its repossession in the sum of $66.64.
As to the value of the refrigerator, the facts are
undisputed, as shown by the purchase contract introduced
in evidence. The refrigerator was sold for $75.00 cash
upon the closing of the contract and 14 consecutive
monthly installments all in the sum of $10.00, with the
exception of the last installment, which was in the sum
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of $11.64, or a total price of $216.64. This would indicate that Plaintiff had an equity in said refrigerator of
not to exceed $150.00. In other words, if the jury had
found that the refrigerator was worth as much at the
time of its repossession in May, 1939 as when sold in
July, 1938, they could have returned a verdict for Plaintiff in the sum not to exceed $150.00. However, there
was no evidence introduced which would justify a value
as high as this.
Plaintiff produced as a witness on his behalf on
the question of value one Thomas Jensen, who testified
that an electric refrigerator depreciated 10% of its value
each year. In other words, this $216.64 refrigerator
would depreciate $21.16 a year, which would leave a value
at the end of the first year of $195.48, which, after deducting $66.64 would amount to a value of $128.84. If
this testimony were followed out to its ultimate conclusion, a deduction for depreciation of 5/6 of 10%, or
$17.65 would result, and this deducted from the cost
price of $216.64 would give a figure of $198.99. Deducting the balance due, that is $66.64, from $198.99, leaves
a balance of $132.35 as the value of Plaintiff's interest
which was converted by the Defendants.
Defendant General Electric Contracts Corporation,
however, elicited from its witness, Stephen Lyon, who
had been engaged in the electric appliance business for
13 years, that a refrigerator depreciates 40% of its value
the first year and 30% of its remaining value each sue.
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ceeding year. According to this the depreciation on the
refrigerator in question the first year would amount to
$86.66, leaving a value of $129.98 and after deducting the
unpaid balance. of $66.64 there would remain the sum of
$63.34 as the value of Plaintiff's interest in said refrigerator.
The jury, however, saw fit to disregard all of this
testimony, as well as the instructions of the court, and
assessed the value of the refrigerator at $184.14, which
was the sum of $34.14 more than the amount paid in by
Plaintiff for the refrigerator. Thus, not only was the
instruction of the court on the question of damages completely outside the pale, but the jury completely disregarded the testimony.
Plaintiff recognized this error and attempted to
correct the same by filing on February 16, 1940, a motion
to reduce judgment, which had been entered upon the
verdict, in the amount of $66.64. Although Plaintiff does
not so state, it is probably upon the assumption that if
the jury had been properly instructed and if the jury
had followed the testimony and instructions that they
would have returned a verdict of $66.64 less than the
verdict they returned. On the same date the Plaintiff
filed a document he captained a ''Remittitur'' in which
he said that the Plaintiff remits from the verdict of the
jury the sum of $66.64. Thereafter on February 19, 1940
the court made and entered an order reciting that a verdict. had been returned and that a motion to reduce
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judgment had been filed and that a remittitur had been
filed, and the court ordered ''That the said motion to reduce judgment be and the same is hereby granted and
that the remittitur of $66.64 is by the court approved."
There is nothing in the record to show exactly what
the judgment now is in this matter. Appellant takes the
position that the motion to reduce judgment, the remittitur and the order of the court reducing judgment, all
of which papers are found in the transcript between
pages 141 and 145 and in the abstract on pages 60, 61 and
62, are a complete nullity. The errors of the court in
his instructions and the errors of the jury in failing to
follow the instructions of the court cannot be so corrected.
There is no such procedure provided by statute or by
common law, and to assume that because the jury has
returned a value for the refrigerator in excess of the
undisputed evidence and that this may have been caused
by failure of the court to give proper instructions on
damages, that therefore it became the province of the
attorney for Plaintiff and the court to fix the value of
the refrigerator, is to say the least, new, novel and
unique.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that there was no unlawful repossession of the Fausett refrigerator. Plaintiff
was in default on his contract and under his contract a
repossession such as accomplished by Defendant Hold-
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away was authorized. Defendant Holdaway, in repossessing the refrigerator, was acting for and on behalf of
himself alone in protecting his obligation as a guarantor,
and under his agreement with General Electric Contracts
Corporation he had been instructed to repurchase the
Fausett obligation at the time he repossessed the refrigerator.
The instruction as to damages was erroneous and
the jury failed to follow the evidence and these errors
can not be corrected by the court's assuming the function
of the jury in fixing the amount of damages which he
believes the jury would have returned had the jury been
properly instructed and had the jury followed the testimony and evidence adduced before it.
Respectfully submitted,

FABIAN, CLENDENIN, MOFFAT
& MABEY,
Attorneys for Appellant General
Electric Contracts Corporation.
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